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How Supreme Court Precedent Sheds Light on
Corporate Bill of Attainder Claims
By: Alina Veneziano, LLM; JD*
I. INTRODUCTION
The propriety of big-tech corporations to receive constitutional rights to
the same extent as a natural person is heavily debated. This topic has
become especially apparent in light of the Huawei case, where Huawei
Technologies sued the United States claiming that its ban on Huawei
products was unconstitutional1 because it violated the U.S Bill of Attainder
Clause. The Bill of Attainder Clause prohibits the legislature from passing a
law that declares an individual or group of individuals guilty of a crime
without a judicial trial.2 In response, the U.S. government claimed that
Huawei products posed a national security risk to the intelligence of U.S.
systems, which was precisely the reason it banned Huawei products in the
2019 National Defense Authorization Act.3
To better understand how and under what circumstances the Bill of
Attainder Clause applies to a corporate entity, an examination of how the
Supreme Court has extended other constitutional guarantees to corporations
is warranted. The Supreme Court has extended certain constitutional

* Alina Veneziano, Ph.D. Candidate at King’s College London, UK; LL.M., New York
University School of Law, 2019; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 2018;
M.B.A., Western Governors University; B.S., Accounting, Western Governors
University. Ms. Veneziano is a member of the Bar of the State of New York.
1
Complaint, Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 440 F. Supp.3d 607 (E.D. Tex.
2019) (No. 4-19-cv-00159).
2
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law will be
passed.”).
3
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L.
No. 115-232, § 889, 132 Stat. 1636 (2018).
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guarantees to corporations such as the criminal jury trial guarantee. In some
cases, the Court has declined to extend other guarantees including the right
against self-incrimination. However, issues regarding Bill of Attainder
claims’ applicability to corporations have yet to come before the Court. The
reason for the Court’s decision that some constitutional guarantees are
inapplicable to corporations is because those guarantees are considered
individual and personal rights, and therefore cannot be asserted by
corporations.
This brief article urges that corporate Bill of Attainder claims cannot be
applicable to corporations because such claims are not personal rights and
cannot be relied upon by corporate entities. Part II outlines which
constitutional rights are applicable to corporations, which are not, and
which are undecided. Part III analogizes the approach the Supreme Court
has used for other constitutional guarantees for corporations and applies it
to the Bill of Attainder Clause. Part IV presents the conclusion.

II. THE SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS REGARDING CORPORATE
EXTENSIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES
The Judicial Branch has experienced difficulty deciding corporate Bill of
Attainder claims due to the artificial nature of the corporation.4
Nevertheless, this difficult task rests solely with the Judiciary.5 Here, the
Court has adopted an approach of selective incorporation regarding the
extension of constitutional guarantees to the corporate entity. Examples of
constitutional provisions that the Court has extended to the corporation
include the Contract Clause,6 the Takings Clause,7 the Sixth Amendment

4
See Charles O’Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social
and Political Expression and the Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67
GEO. L.J. 1347, 1348 (1979).
5
See id.
6
See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
7
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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criminal jury trial guarantee,8 the Fourth Amendment freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures,9 the Fifth10 and Fourteenth11
Amendment Due Process Clauses, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause,12 the Fifth Amendment protection against double
jeopardy,13 and the First Amendment rights to religious freedoms14 and free
speech.15 Certain constitutional guarantees that the Court has held to be
inapplicable to the corporation include the Privileges and Immunities
Clause in Article IV16 and the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.17 The Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the right to
grand jury indictment for corporations, but lower courts have held that this
guarantee is not applicable to them.18 Similarly, the Supreme Court has
never decided whether the Eighth Amendment applies to corporations and
has refused to do so where the outcome of the case did not turn on such a
determination.19

8
See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994);
see also Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975).
9
See generally Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); see also Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307 (1978).
10
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); see also
Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165 (1893).
11
See Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
12
See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); see also Santa Clara Cty. v. S.
Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
13
See United States. v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977).
14
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
15
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also First
Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
16
See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839); see also Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S.
168 (1868).
17
See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); see also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 75 (1906); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
18
United States v. Macklin, 389 F.Supp. 272, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (“The corporate
defendants . . . are not subject to any term of imprisonment if convicted of the charges
against them. Accordingly, the charges against them are not ‘infamous’ within the
meaning of the fifth amendment.”).
19
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22 (1989)
(“We shall not decide whether the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines
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When analyzing when, why, and under what circumstances a specific
constitutional guarantee ought to extend to the corporate entity, the Court
separates the purpose of each constitutional provision. It then analyzes the
propriety of corporate extension of that provision.
For instance, the Court in Dartmouth College held that the Contracts
Clause applies to corporations. In so holding, Chief Justice Marshall noted
that the corporate entity is “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law.”20 It possesses only those rights in
the charter conferred upon it by the state, and even though the corporate
entity is immortal, it possesses no more political power or no more of a
political character than would a natural person.21 Among some of these
powers that effectuate the purpose of the Contracts Clause include the
ability to “manage [the corporation’s] own affairs, and to hold property.”22
On this point, commentaries have observed that the Contracts Clause
promotes “voluntary private relations,” and because corporations have
purposes that are means to ends—some of which involve private
contracting—it would be illogical to deny corporations the power conferred
via their charters to achieve those ends by refusing to extend the guarantees
of the Contracts Clause.23 In other words, the purpose of the Contracts
Clause is not an individualistic one. Confining its protections only to
natural persons would not serve to effectuate its purpose to ensure voluntary
private relationships and contracting.
Where there is no reason why the constitutional guarantee at issue needs
to be limited to natural persons to effectuate the guarantee’s purpose, that
guarantee should also be applicable to corporations. Similarly, there was no

applies to the several States through the Fourteenth Amendment, nor shall we decide
whether the Eighth Amendment protects corporations as well as individuals.”).
20
See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1504–05 (1989).
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distinction drawn as to why the Fourth Amendment guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures should be different for individuals
compared to corporations. The Court in Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc. noted
that “the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment protects commercial
buildings as well as private homes” and that to hold otherwise, “would belie
the origin of that Amendment, and the American colonial experience.”24 At
times, the Supreme Court did not even entertain arguments on whether
there should be a distinction between individuals and corporations
regarding some constitutional guarantees. In Santa Clara County, for
example, the Court noted that it did not want to hear arguments on whether
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
corporations since “[w]e are all of opinion that it does.”25 Similarly, the
purpose of the First Amendment’s freedom of speech is to promote the
spread of ideas and protected speech without fear of punishment. In
Citizens United, the Court asserted that “[c]orporations and other
associations, like individuals, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the
dissemination of information and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to
foster.”26 The speaker of the communication is irrelevant when considering
the protections provided by the First Amendment’s freedom of speech
clause.
A similar approach can be observed with respect to rights that the
Supreme Court has refused to extend or to acknowledge as applicable to
corporations. For example, the purpose of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause in Article IV is to guarantee citizens the same rights and protections
under the law no matter where they are in the United States. In Bank of
Augusta v. Earle, the Court observed how corporate extension here would
not serve this purpose. “[C]orporations are neither persons nor partners, but

24

Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978).
Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
26
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (quoting First
Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)).
25
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artificial bodies politic, created by act of state . . . .”27 The Court continued
by stating that “[t]he only rights [a corporation] can claim are the rights
which are given to it.”28 Thus, corporate extension of this guarantee to give
the corporate entity both the privileges and liabilities entitled to citizens29
would not advance the purpose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause due
to these special privileges of corporations. It would also be inconsistent
with the corporation’s special privileges, as the Court observed, for the
corporate entity to have both the privileges and the liabilities—such as
obligations—entitled to citizens.30
Additionally, the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination
has not been extended to corporations because to do so would not serve the
purpose of this provision, which is to “respect[] a private inner sanctum of
individual feeling and thought” by forbidding intrusion “to extract selfcondemnation.”31 The Court has noted that the purpose of preventing
compulsory self-disclosure of information is to protect “individual civil
liberties,” and therefore could not have been intended “to protect economic
or other interests of [the corporate entity] so as to nullify appropriate
governmental regulations.”32 Lastly, to briefly comment on the Eighth
Amendment, its purposes are to prohibit excessive fines, physical torture,
and certain jail conditions. Even though the Court has left open the question
of applicability of this Amendment to corporations,33 it has noted that the
basic purpose of the Eighth Amendment is “nothing less than the dignity of

27

Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 584 (1839).
Id. at 587.
29
Id. at 586.
30
Id. (“If . . . members of a corporation were to be regarded as individuals carrying on
business in their corporate name, and therefore entitled to the privileges of citizens . . .
they must at the same time take upon themselves the liabilities of citizens,” an approach
inconsistent with the corporation’s special privileges.).
31
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974) (quoting Couch v. U.S., 409 U.S. 322,
327 (1973)).
32
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944).
33
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22 (1989).
28
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man.”34 Further, it is obvious that a corporation cannot be held in jail
pending trial nor physically tortured due to the corporation’s lack of a
physical body and ability to perceive pain and cruelty. Thus, the speaker of
the statement is relevant for purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s protection
against self-incrimination.
Thus, in analyzing whether a constitutional provision applies to
corporations, the Supreme Court has adopted a broad trend of determining
the essential purpose of each constitutional provision.35 This phenomenon is
significant because it focuses on the constitutional right at issue. In other
words, the Court is not as concerned with who or what the constitutional
right was historically applied to or against as it is with the “historical
purpose of the provision and [then] whether corporate protection serves that
purpose.”36 Thus, two questions need to be answered: (1) what is the basic
purpose of the Bill of Attainder Clause?; and (2) does extension of that
guarantee to the corporate entity serve that purpose?

III. APPLYING THE SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO THE BILL OF
ATTAINDER CLAUSE
Corporations can convey property, enter into contracts, and sue and be
sued, just as an individual is able to do so. But while these rights work for
corporations despite their claimed individual nature, there are some other

34

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (“Whether or not
a particular guarantee is ‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to corporations for some other
reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional
provision.”); see also Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations,
163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 110–11 (2014) (arguing that constitutional analysis is not based
on the “nature of different types of entities” so much as it is based on “examining the
purposes of the particular constitutional right”); see also Karey P. Pond, Constitutional
LawThe Telecommunications Act of 1996: When Legislative Regulation Becomes
Unconstitutional Punishment, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 271, 307 (2000) (contending that
“whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of a constitutional guarantee depends
on the nature of the guarantee at issue.”).
36
Pond, supra note 35, at 309.
35
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individual rights that do not make sense for a corporation to possess such as
the right to marry, the right to privacy, or the right to vote. But what about
constitutional rights? Which constitutional rights make sense for individuals
but not for corporations? For instance, as noted above, corporations enjoy a
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
but do not have a Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.
Additionally, corporations have the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy of the Fifth Amendment but not the protection against the
excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the Eighth
Amendment. The Court has made these determinations by examining the
purpose of the relevant constitutional guarantees and then by asking
whether those purposes would be consistent with extension of those
guarantees to corporations.
What about the Bill of Attainder Clause of the U.S. Constitution? The
purpose of the Bill of Attainder Clause is not analogizable to the purpose of
the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech, which has been afforded
to corporations. The essential purpose of the free speech guarantee is to
foster the dissemination of protected speech to the public. Even though the
corporation cannot speak, “its business requires individual speech.”37 But
the human character of the disseminator is irrelevant for the essential
purpose of the right to be manifested and fulfilled. This is not an example of
a constitutional guarantee that is personal to each individual and is therefore
not an individual right.
However, the purpose of the Bill of Attainder Clause is analogizable to
the purpose of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. They
are both individualistic rights. The Fifth Amendment’s purpose is “that of
protecting personal privacy.”38 But whose personal privacy? In 1944, the
Supreme Court held that this privilege is a personal one and applies only to

37
38

O’Kelley, supra note 4, at 1360.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976).
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“natural individuals,” and therefore, not to corporations.39 In Bellotti, the
Court analogized the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to
“‘purely personal’ guarantees” and noted that these guarantees were
unavailable to corporations because the “historic function” limited
protection to individuals.40 Further, corporate Fifth Amendment rights
would impair government investigations.41 As scholars have rightly
observed, a corporation attempting to invoke the right against selfincrimination would be like an individual refusing to speak to the police
under the Fifth Amendment right by claiming that their statement would
incriminate someone else.42 Extension of the Clause to corporations would
not fit with the approach the Supreme Court has used in determining which
guarantees belong to corporations.

IV. CONCLUSION
The applicability of the Bill of Attainder Clause to corporations is a
tricky issue. Huawei’s ability to claim and support its arguments based on a
violation of this Clause is problematic because the Supreme Court has never
addressed whether the Bill of Attainder Clause is applicable to corporate
entities. But analyzing the Supreme Court’s precedent regarding which
constitutional guarantees are applicable to corporations and why such rights
are applicable reveals a simple analogy: if the constitutional guarantee in
question is a personal, individualistic right, it does not belong to and cannot
be relied upon by the corporate entity.
Therefore, to answering the two questions posed at the end of Part II: (1)
the basic purpose of the Bill of Attainder Clause is to protect individuals
from punishment and prevent legislative determinations of guilt; and (2)

39

United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698–99 (1944).
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14.
41
See Garrett, supra note 35, at 130.
42
Id. (“One person cannot refuse to speak to police under the Fifth Amendment by
asserting the potential to incriminate another person.”).
40
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corporate extension of the guarantee of the Bill of Attainder Clause would
not serve this purpose. Because of this, the Supreme Court should address,
as soon as possible, that the Bill of Attainder Clause of the U.S.
Constitution is a personal right that is wholly inapplicable to the corporate
entity. Once the Supreme Court makes such a determination, Huawei’s bill
of attainder claim will be rightfully mooted.
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